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Comments
THE BAND FROM HELL: AN EXAMINATION OF SUICIDE ON
STAGE AS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Hell on Earth is a hard-rock band unlike many others. This
small band, originating in South Florida, has gained considerable
1
notoriety for their wild stage antics. In addition to the usual loud
music and screaming fans, Hell on Earth has engaged in outrageous concert stunts including wrestling in chocolate syrup,
sodomizing skinned calves, and drinking concoctions of blended
rats. 2 Their latest enterprise shocked not only South Florida, but
3
concert-goers and politicians everywhere. On October 4, 2003,
Florida,
Hell on Earth was scheduled to perform in St. Petersburg,
4
where they planned to feature a live suicide onstage.
William ("Billy") Tourtelot, Hell on Earth's leader, told report-5
ers that a terminally-ill man would be committing suicide onstage.
The band hoped that the public suicide of a terminally-ill person
1. See Carrie Johnson, City will fight suicide concert, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S.
PINELLAS ED., Sept. 26, 2003 [hereinafter Fight Concert] ("Tourtelot... is known for
outrageous onstage antics."), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/
results.html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth; see also Josh Bashara, Suicide Is Painless, THE
GATEWAY, Oct. 7, 2003 [hereinafter Painless] (discussing "macabre stunts" performed by Hell on Earth), available at http://www.unogateway.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/10/07/3f8lfc6de5cl c.
2. See Painless, supra note 1 (describing stunts at Hell on Earth concerts).
3. See Alisa Ulferts, Bill targets suicidefor public show, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S.
PINELLAS ED., Oct. 29, 2003 [hereinafter Bill Targets Suicide for Show] ("State Sen.
Les Miller had a near visceral reaction when he heard last month that a rock group
planned to feature a live suicide on stage in St. Petersburg."), available at http://
pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth.
4. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (noting band intended to present onstage
suicide in support of euthanasia); see also New Law Passed to Block Concert Suicide, at
http://entertainment.msn.com/news/article.aspx?news=135666 (Sept. 29, 2003)
[hereinafter New Law] (quoting one council member who raised possibility that
suicide may simply be publicity stunt, but still wanting to exercise caution).
5. See Gina Vivinetto, Band promotes 'onstage suicide' Series, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES: S. PINELLAS ED., Sept. 17, 2003 [hereinafter Band Promotes] (noting it was
uncertain whether Tourtelot's announcement was merely publicity stunt and local
police did not yet know how to respond to situation), available at http://pqasb.
pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt-hell+On+Earth.

(27)
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would raise awareness of right-to-die issues. 6 The goal of Hell on
Earth was frustrated, however, when one of the owners of the venue
canceled the performance. 7 In addition, Florida has a statute
prohibiting assisted self-murder and the St. Petersburg City Council
acted to make certain that the concert and suicide would not take
place.8 On September 29, 2003, the council met and discussed
passing an emergency ordinance. 9 The ordinance would make it
illegal to conduct a suicide for entertainment or commercial purposes, and to host, promote, or sell tickets for that event. 10 On October 2, 2003, Circuit Judge John C. Lenderman issued an order
banning the assisted suicide."
6. See New Law, supra note 4 (discussing intent of concert suicide). In an email, the band's leader, Billy Tourtelot, reportedly wrote, "[t] his show is far more
than a typical Hell On Earth performance, . . . This is about standing up for what
you believe in, and I am a strong supporter of physician-assisted suicide." Id. On

the Hell on Earth website, Tourtelot stated that he intended to go forward with the
suicide to honor the oath he gave to his terminally-ill friend, a member of the
Euthanasia Society. See Hell on Earth, at http://www.hellonearth.net (last visited
Nov. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Hell Website] (describing Tourtelot's intention behind
featuring live, onstage suicide). Despite the band's right-to-die platform, national
right-to-die organizations have denounced Hell on Earth's plan. See Tom Zucco &
Carrie Johnson, Good family name bears Hell on Earth, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S. PiNELLAS ED., Oct. 4, 2003 [hereinafter Good Family] (noting band's lack of support
from right-to-die organizations), availableat http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/
results.html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth.
7. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (indicating part-owner was warned by St. Petersburg police that crowd could get out of control); see also Carrie Johnson, Suicide
concert is a no show, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S. PINELLAS ED., Oct. 5, 2003 [hereinafter No Show] (noting part-owner Dave Hundley canceled show on September 24,
2003), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt=
hell+On+Earth.
8. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 2004). Section 782.08 states in pertinent part: "Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of selfmurder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree." Id.; see also
Carrie Johnson, Rocker invisible in limelight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S. PINELLAS ED.,
Oct. 2, 2003 (noting in Florida, second-degree felony is punishable by up to fifteen
years in prison), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?
QryTxt=hell+On+Earth. Florida's prohibition against assisted suicide dates back to
1868. See Phil Long, Hell on Earth insists suicide plan is still on, MIAMI HERALD.COM, at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6902048.htm (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Plan is On] (describing Florida's prohibition of "self-murder").
9. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (noting council discussed passing emergency
ordinance Monday, September 29, 2003).
10. See Carrie Johnson, City, judge intervene in concert, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S.
PINELLAS ED., Sept. 30, 2003 [hereinafter Judge Intervenes] (indicating violation of
city's ordinance could result in sixty-dayjail sentence and $500.00 fine), available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth.
11. See Carrie Johnson, Judge orders halt to suicide show, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES:
LATE TAMPA ED., Oct. 3, 2003 (noting if band defies judge's ruling, it could be held

in contempt of court and sentenced to as much as one year in jail), available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth.
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The intrepid Tourtelot did not let the ruling deter him from
his objective; the band announced that it would proceed with its
mission. 12 Hell on Earth claimed that the concert and suicide
would take place at two different undisclosed locations in St. Petersburg and would be broadcast via the band's website. 13 On October
5, 2003, the band informed the Associated Press that the concert
had taken place the previous evening at one of the secret locations,
but the band did not know if the suicide of the terminally-ill patient
had taken place at the other location.1 4 Fans who tried to access
the Hell on Earth website were directed to an alternate website,
and suicide were going to be
which stated that the performance
15
week.
that
shown sometime
The city ordinance appeared to have prevented the planned
suicide, as there was no evidence that the suicide actually took
place.' 6 Neither the concert nor the suicide was broadcast on the
17
Internet, and the police did not receive any calls for a suicide.
Nevertheless, at least one additional venue has canceled a Hell on
12. See Plan is On, supra note 8 (reporting band intended to go forward with
concert and suicide).
13. See Good Family, supra note 6 (discussing Hell on Earth's intention to carry
out suicide); see also Hell Website, supranote 6 (posting on band's website declared
concert would go on despite lack of venue).
14. See No Show, supra note 7 (stating suicide concert was "a dud"). Radio
host, Shane Bugbee, maintained that he had possession of a video of the Hell on
Earth performance, and he claimed that it showed a sickly-looking man committing suicide through "some sort of asphyxiation." See Robert Farley, Radio host proclaims he has suicide video, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES: S. PINELLAS ED., Oct. 6, 2003
(describing video), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.
html?QryTxt=hell+On+Earth. Bugbee admitted he did not know whether the suicide was authentic or staged, but planned to make the video available to the public. See id.
15. See No Show, supra note 7 (noting band's website announced suicide to
take place at later date). The band's website was inaccessible for most of Saturday,
October 4, 2003; the company that provided the band's Internet service had closed
the site because of too many hits. See id. The site was available again that evening
at 8:30 p.m., an hour after the concert was scheduled to begin. See id. A note on
the website directed fans to another website: "www.evilnow.com." See id. The link
stated that the concert and suicide would be broadcast sometime that week, but
provided no other details. See id.
16. See Michael Sandler, County moves to ban public suicides, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES: STATE ED., Oct. 18, 2003 [hereinafter Ban Suicides] (noting after St. Petersburg City Council passed emergency act outlawing suicide for commercial purposes, Pinellas County passed similar ordinance outlawing all public suicides),
available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxt=
hell+On+Earth.
17. See No Show, supra note 7 ("Police, who had been on alert for the suicide
concert, said late Saturday [October 4, 2003] that nothing had happened, as far as
they could tell.").
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Earth show due to liability concerns if a suicide were to occur during the show. 18
The actions of the St. Petersburg City Council were bold and
arguably commendable in an effort to prevent a suicide for entertainment purposes.1 9 Hell on Earth, however, argued that the
government acted solely to prevent it from promoting its support of
physician-assisted suicide. 20 If the band's actions constituted expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the government may
have violated Hell on Earth's right to free speech as guaranteed by
21
the United States Constitution.
This Comment focuses on the association of suicide on stage
and the First Amendment.2 2 Part II discusses categories of governmental regulations, unprotected speech, and speech protected by
the First Amendment. 2 3 Part III raises the various issues concerning Hell on Earth's conduct under First Amendment jurisprudence. 24 Finally, Part IV concludes this discussion of suicide on
25
stage and First Amendment rights.
18. See Michael Van Sickler, Band feels bite of controversy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES:
12, 2003 [hereinafter Band Feels Bite] (noting Hell on Earth
was scheduled to play at Brass Mug bar in Tampa, but bar owner canceled show
after authorities warned her she could be liable if anything illegal happened),
available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/results.html?QryTxthell+On+Earth. The owner of the Brass Mug reported that she received at least
ten phone calls warning her that the terminally-ill patient did exist and the suicide
would take place at her bar, if the show went on as planned. See id.
19. See New Law, supra note 4 (discussing band's plan to feature onstage suicide). Despite the absence of the Internet concert and suicide, city council member Bill Foster said the city's efforts were not wasted because it now has an
ordinance to prevent a similar event. See No Show, supra note 7 (noting city council
member planned to ask state legislators to pass law to protect other cities).
20. See Band Feels Bite, supra note 18 (noting Hell on Earth's belief that government was "watching" them). The band's leader, Billy Tourtelot, said the cancellation at the Brass Mug was further proof that government officials did not want him
to promote his support for physician-assisted suicide, stating, "[t]he government
won't let us play anywhere." Id.
21. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects both
speech and expressive conduct. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
(holding state may not punish defendant for wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck
the Draft," despite provocative message). For a discussion of expressive conduct,
see infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 26-45
and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of government regulations and both protected and unprotected speech under the First Amendment, see infra notes 30-74 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion on the potential aspects of how Hell on Earth's conduct
could implicate the First Amendment, see infra notes 76-167 and accompanying
text.
25. For a discussion of suicide on stage and First Amendment Rights, see infra
notes 166-88 and accompanying text.
LATE TAMPA ED., Oct.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss1/2

4

Cameron: The Band from Hell: An Examinatioin of Suicide on Stage as Expres

2005]

SUICIDE ON STAGE

II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from governmental interference in the areas of re26
At the very heart of the First
ligion, assembly, press and speech.
Amendment is the requirement that the government cannot restrict expression because of "its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content."27 Nevertheless, this broad protection of free speech
is not absolute. 28 The government may lawfully regulate unprotected speech as well as protected speech under certain
29
circumstances.
A.

Tiered Scrutiny

When the government imposes regulations that burden protected speech, the regulations are subject to a comprehensive
30
Three main tests have evolved to
framework of tiered scrutiny.
3 1
The test
determine when governmental action is constitutional.
32
This
test.
most deferential to the government is the rational basis
test applies to governmental actions involving neither a fundamental interest nor a suspect class and is generally applied to social or
26. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see
also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (noting First Amendment applies
to state and local governments through Fourteenth Amendment).
27. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding city's content-based restrictions on picketing were unconstitutional).
28. See e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (noting
"the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances").
29. See e.g., id. at 572 (allowing states to ban use of fighting words because
government's interests in peace and order outweigh any social value of such
speech). Fighting words are, "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. A live, onstage suicide,
although an action rather than words, could fit within this definition because of
the physical injury to the suicide victim and potential breach of peace among the
audience members.
30. See e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)) (stating statutes based on racial classifications require strict scrutiny).
31. See Cleburne, 470 U.S. at 440-41 (outlining tests and application to constitutional issues).
32. See id. at 440 (noting general rule that legislation is presumed valid and
will be sustained if classification drawn by statute is rationally related to legitimate
state interest).
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economic legislation.33 The general rule is that legislation is presumed valid and only requires a showing that the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.3 4.
The most exacting scrutiny is afforded to classifications involving a fundamental right or a suspect class, such as race or national
origin.3 5 This strict scrutiny test demands that the government
demonstrate a compelling interest with means narrowly tailored to
achieve that objective. 36 Under this test, there is a strong presumption that the classification is invalid, and it will often be struck
37

down.

Classifications falling between the two extremes, such as gender or illegitimacy, trigger intermediate scrutiny. 38 This test requires that the statutory classification be substantially related to an
important governmental objective.3 9

33. See id. (stating government is allowed wide latitude when social or economic legislation is at issue). A fundamental interest involves rights recognized by
the courts that must be free from unfettered governmental interference. See e.g.,
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 613 (1987) (noting fundamental interest in continuation of parental care and support). A suspect class includes those individuals
that have historically been subjected to discrimination. See id. at 602-03 (citing
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)) (noting group not suspect class if "they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically
powerless").
34. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (citing Heller v. Doe
by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)) (stating rational basis standard mandates upholding classification if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts providing
rational basis for classification).
35. See e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to
Virginia's miscegenation statute outlawing interracial marriage); see also Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 440 ("These factors [race, alienage, national origin] are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy .... ).
36. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting strict scrutiny requires compelling
state interest with means suitably tailored to achieve that interest).
37. See id. (noting laws grounded in such considerations as race, alienage, or
national origin likely reflect prejudice and antipathy). But see Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding evidence of
discriminatory animus required to invalidate government action resulting in racially disproportionate impact).
38. See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (holding all
gender-based classifications warrant heightened scrutiny and not merely deferential analysis).
39. See e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding Pennsylvania's
six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions unconstitutional because not
substantially related to state's proffered interest of avoiding litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims).
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The level of scrutiny required depends on the type of regulation at issue. 40 The government may legitimately seek to impose
conduct-based legislation, and it generally has wide latitude in implementing such regulations. 41 For regulations that are purely conduct-based, the government is subject only to a rational basis
review. 4 2 Government regulations that are viewpoint based are subject to the most exacting scrutiny and must satisfy the difficult strict
scrutiny standard. 43 It is presumably unconstitutional for the government to burden speech solely because of its content. 44 The government can impose a content-neutral regulation involving a
nonpublic forum, so long as the regulation 4 5has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate regulatory purpose.

40. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440-41
(2002) (explaining content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
41. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting government's wide latitude in regulating areas of social and economic legislation).
42. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (noting rational
basis review is deferential to government and will not be overturned unless regulation is so unrelated to any legitimate purpose).
43. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)
(explaining that content-based statutes are subject to strict scrutiny because they
place weight of government behind disparagement or suppression of some
messages). "The right to express unpopular views does not necessarily immunize a
speaker from liability for resorting to otherwise impermissible behavior meant to
Id. at 735-36.
shock members of the speaker's audience ....
44. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (holding invalid law that imposed financial burden
on speakers because of content of their speech).
45. Public forums include those areas that have historically been open to
speech-related activities, such as sidewalks, streets, and public parks. See Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (explaining public fora include
places held in trust for use of public, such as streets and parks, whose use, "from
ancient times, [has] been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens"). A designated public forum encompasses those areas that have been
opened to the public, but have not historically been open to speech-related activities, such as school rooms for after-hours instruction. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting designated public
forum exists when government has intentionally selected place or means of communication, and speakers cannot be excluded without compelling governmental
interest). Nonpublic forums include most public property, and the government
can freely regulate speech as long as the regulations are reasonably related to a
legitimate government purpose and are viewpoint neutral. See id. at 806. Regardless of the forum, the government is prohibited from regulating speech based on
viewpoint. See id. The State Theater in St. Petersburg, Florida, is a nonpublic forum, as it is a privately owned venue. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (noting owner
of venue canceled performance).
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Unprotected Speech

Not all speech is automatically protected by the First Amend-

ment.4 6 There are five categories of speech that remain unprotected by the First Amendment.4 7 First, speech that is likely to

incite imminent lawless action is unprotected. 48 This is speech that
encourages imminent lawless action and such action is likely to result from the speech. 49 Second, the government may lawfully proscribe "fighting words," or those words that, when addressed to an
ordinary citizen, are inherently likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation. 50 Third, the government may properly regulate ob-

scenity. 5 1 The Supreme Court has defined obscenity as material
that deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest,
portrays sex in a patently offensive way, and does not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 52 Fourth, the government may prohibit speech that is defamatory. 53 Finally, the government may prohibit speech that constitutes false advertising. 54
46. See e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (holding obscenity is
not protected speech and can be regulated by states).

47. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("[T]hese areas of
speech [obscenity, defamation, fighting words] can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content ....")
(emphasis in original). For a discussion on how First Amendment protection is
not absolute, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
48. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action.").
49. See id. (holding incitement to lawless action properly proscribable under
First Amendment).
50. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (describing fighting words as consisting of face-to-face verbal insults that are likely to provoke violence or which by their very utterance inflict injury). For a discussion on how
onstage suicide could fit the definition of fighting words, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
51. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24 (holding obscene materials properly subject to
government regulation). Government regulation of obscenity is limited to those
works involving sexual conduct, as specifically defined by state law, which "do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." See id. at 24.
52. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (holding prohibition of obscene mailings properly proscribable under First Amendment).
53. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge
the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First
Amendment.").
54. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (noting it is constitutional to suppress commercial messages that do
not accurately inform public).
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Even if the speech is unprotected because it falls into one of
the five categories, the Supreme Court is less likely to uphold the
regulation if it is a prior restraint.55 A prior restraint is a regulation
that prevents communication from ever reaching the public, such
as an injunction or a licensing system. 56 Such a restraint requires
strict scrutiny, must fit within a narrow exception to the prohibition
against prior restraints, and must contain procedural safeguards
that limit the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected
speech. 57 Generally, a court will uphold a prior restraint if some
58
special harm would otherwise result.

C.

Protected Speech

Speech not falling into one of the categories of unprotected
speech is protected under the First Amendment. 59 The Supreme
Court has afforded First Amendment protection to several categories of speech, including advertising, 60 political speech, 61 and
entertainment.

62

55. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
(noting significant presumption against constitutional validity of prior restraints).
56. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.").
57. See Southeastern,420 U.S. at 558-59 (noting validity of exceptions cannot be
evaluated in absence of appropriate and necessary procedural safeguards).
58. The Supreme Court has explained that the harm needs to be especially
significant when a prior restraint is involved. See Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (prohibiting anti-war speech in times of conflict). "The question in every case is whether the words used.., create a clear and present danger
• . . that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (refusing to enjoin publication of The Pentagon
Papers on basis that publication would have adverse effect on Vietnam War).
59. See Glenn M. Schley, Comment, The DigitalMillennium Copyright Act and the
First Amendment: How FarShould Courts Go to Protect Intellectual Property Rights?, 3 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 115, 119 (2004) (noting First Amendment protects right to express
ideas).
60. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (holding advertising is form of commercial speech protected
under First Amendment).
61. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The political speech of candidates is at the heart of the First Amendment, and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply
beyond the power of government to impose.").
62. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (noting
First Amendment protects motion pictures, radio and television programs, and live
entertainment such as musical and dramatic works). Importantly, speech that contains unpopular content is still within the purview of the First Amendment. See
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991) (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988))
("The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a
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In addition to actual speech, the First Amendment protects
conduct that is undertaken to communicate an idea.63 This type of
communication is "expressive conduct," and if it has a sufficient
communicative element, it may be protected by the First Amendment.64 To determine if speech constitutes expressive conduct, it
must intend to convey a specific message, and that message must
have a strong likelihood to be understood by those who view it.65
The protection afforded this category of speech is not absolute,
however, and must satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard. 6 6
Even speech that is classified as unprotected may still be protected if the regulation at issue is viewpoint-based, as the Supreme
Court will not tolerate restrictions in statutes that are designed to
punish particular viewpoints. 67 In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,68 defendant R.A.V. was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance for allegedly burning a cross on an African-American
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.").
63. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1968) (holding government's important interest in facilitating effective functioning of draft system outweighed defendant's right to burn draft card); see alsoJ. William David, Comment,
Is Pennsylvania's Stalking Law Constitutional?,56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 205, 210 (1994)
(noting First Amendment protects conduct having "sufficient 'communicative
element'").
64. SeeJohnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (noting expressive conduct may implicate First
Amendment). In Texas v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted of the desecration
of a venerated object for burning the United States flag. See id. at 400. The court
of criminal appeals recognized that the defendant was engaging in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. See id. The Supreme Court agreed and
overturned the conviction, holding that "[tihe State's interest in preventing
breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson's conduct
did not threaten to disturb the peace." Id. at 420. The Court further held that the
state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity
did not justify Johnson's criminal conviction for engaging in political expression.
See id.
65. See id. at 404 (noting Court has held certain conduct can be sufficiently
imbued with communicative elements to fall within scope of First Amendment); see
also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (defining expressive conduct). For example, the Supreme Court has recognized the expressive nature of
students wearing armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (holding First Amendment protects wearing armbands). The Court has also recognized
protected expression in a sit-in by African-Americans in a "whites only" area to
protest segregation. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1966) (recognizing
First Amendment can protect demonstrations).
66. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
67. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding ordinance
targeting viewpoint is facially unconstitutional).
68. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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family's lawn. 69 The ordinance prohibited the display of a symbol
which one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender. '70 The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was facially
unconstitutional because it imposed special prohibitions on those
speakers who expressed views on certain disfavored subjects, including race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 71 The Court further
held that even a narrowly-tailored statute is invalid when it goes beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint discrimination. 72 This
73
holds true even when there is a compelling state interest at stake.
Therefore, although fighting words are generally considered unprotected under the First Amendment, the Court in RA.V. held
that even unprotected speech can be protected if the statute was
74
designed specifically to punish a certain viewpoint.

III.

ANALYsis

There are myriad levels of speech and conduct through which
Hell on Earth has implicated the First Amendment. 75 First, Hell on
Earth declared their support of physician-assisted suicide through
press announcements and postings on their website. 7 6 This speech
is merely an assertion of personal opinion. 77 It is not directed at
any particular person, and it is unlikely to result in immediate phys69. See id. at 380 (noting statute proscribed certain fighting words that insult
or provoke violence on basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender).
70. See id. The ordinance stated:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
71. See id. at 391 (noting in practice ordinance goes beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination).
72. See id. at 395 (noting statute is impermissibly content oriented and not
essential to compelling state interest).
73. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (explaining danger of censorship outweighs
protection of community member's human rights).
74. See id. at 391 (holding state may not proscribe fighting words only for
conveying particular message).
75. For a discussion on Hell on Earth's speech and conduct that may implicate the First Amendment, see infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
76. See Judge Intervenes, supra note 10 (noting Hell on Earth posted message on
website in support of euthanasia).
77. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (noting band supported euthanasia).
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ical retaliation. 78 Therefore, this speech falls under the complete
protection of the First Amendment, and the government will fail in
79
any attempt to prohibit this speech.
Second, Hell on Earth used the promise of an onstage suicide
to advertise and promote their concert. 80 Advertising is considered
"commercial speech" and is protected by the First Amendment. 8'
In order to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment,
commercial speech must do "no more than propose a commercial
transaction" and be removed from any "exposition of ideas" and
from "truth, science, morality, and arts in general."8 2 It is doubtful
that the government could prevent this commercial speech, as it is
sufficiently intertwined with the band's viewpoint on euthanasia to
83
render it more than a mere commercial transaction.
Third, while the concert was actually taking place, it can be
assumed that Hell on Earth introduced the suicide with a message.8 4 The band's message would presumably be in support of assisted suicide, as they billed the concert as an effort to raise
awareness for right-to-die issues. 85 Because the communication expresses a particular viewpoint, the government would be unable to
86
regulate that speech.
78. See Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities:Are First
Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?, 39 Burr.
L. REV. 1, 20 n.84 (1991) (noting fighting words doctrine "applies only to those
situations in which the victim of hate speech is likely to respond violently to the
speaker's verbal assault"). In addition, Hell on Earth's announcement in support
of assisted suicide does not fall into any other category of unprotected speech. See
supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing unprotected speech).
79. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) (holding speech is
protected under First Amendment unless it provokes violence).
80. See Band Promotes, supra note 5 (noting Hell on Earth sent e-mail press
releases describing planned onstage suicide of terminally-ill patient).
81. SeeVa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (noting commercial speech is expression related solely to
economic interests of speaker and its audience, but still qualifies for First Amendment protection).
82. Id. at 762 (citations omitted) (noting high standard of removing commercial speech from First Amendment protection).
83. See Hell Website, supranote 6 ("I am a strong supporter of physician-assisted
suicide.").
84. See New Law, supra note 4 (describing intent to raise awareness for euthanasia). An onstage suicide without an introductory message would not inform the
audience of the band's goal, and therefore, would not raise awareness of assisted
suicide and right-to-die issues.
85. See Plan is On, supra note 8 (reporting suicide was effort to raise awareness
of dying with dignity).
86. This message would not fall under any category of unprotected speech.
See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing classifications of unprotected speech). Therefore, if the government chose to prohibit this speech, it
would be doing so based only on the viewpoint of the band, and such regulation is
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Fourth and finally, the more complicated analysis turns on the
role of Hell on Earth and the actual suicide. 8 7 This is the conduct
that the St. Petersburg City Council sought to prevent when it enacted the emergency ordinance. 88 While it is unclear whether Hell
on Earth physically assisted the individual in committing the suicide, they provided the opportunity and a forum for the suicide to
occur.8 9 In addition to providing the means and availability, the act
was likely presented in conjunction with a pro-euthanasia message,
as Hell on Earth wanted to make "back-street suicides a thing of the
past."90 The resulting "suicide conduct" requires a more detailed
examination of First Amendment jurisprudence to determine if the
St. Petersburg City Council acted appropriately in passing the emergency ordinance. 91
A.

Hell on Earth's Suicide Concert as Unprotected Speech

In order to determine whether Hell on Earth's suicide concert
constitutes speech within the meaning of the First Amendment, it is
necessary to first establish whether it falls under any of the five cate-

prohibited. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985) (noting government is prohibited from regulating speech based on
viewpoint).
87. Reports stated that Hell on Earth planned to host the suicide during a
concert, and the band gave no indication that anyone other than the terminally-ill
person would perpetrate the suicide. See Plan is On, supra note 8 (noting band
stated terminally-ill person would commit suicide).
88. See New Law, supra note 4 (noting St. Petersburg City Council unanimously
approved emergency ordinance making it illegal to conduct suicide for commercial or entertainment purposes).
89. See id. (stating suicide would take place at Hell on Earth concert). That
the band provided the means for the suicide to occur is likely sufficient to constitute "assisting" a suicide under the Florida statute prohibiting assisted suicide. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 2004) (stating in pertinent part: "Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree"). The criminal nature of the conduct
does not destroy its First Amendment protection. SeeJames Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize Sex as Expressive Conduct
Under the FirstAmendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves That It Should, 12 LAw &
SEXUALIv 159, 198 (2003) (noting Supreme Court has not adopted view that traditionally criminalized conduct is not protected by First Amendment).
90. Band Promotes, supra note 5 (noting Hell on Earth sent e-mail press release
describing suicide of terminally-ill person as "platform to help make back-street
suicides a thing of the past").
91. For a discussion on the application of the First Amendment to the St.
Petersburg City Council's actions, see infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
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gories of unprotected speech.9 2 If it does, it is outside the scope of
93
the First Amendment.
First, it is unlikely that the government in St. Petersburg could
classify the actions of Hell on Earth as unprotected incitement to
lawless action. 9 4 In a similar arena, singer Ozzy Osbourne was sued
when a listener committed suicide after listening to Osbourne's
song "Suicide Solution. '95 Plaintiffs argued that Osbourne's song
constituted an exception to protected speech because the lyrics encouraged suicide among its listeners.9 6 The court disagreed, noting
there was no indication that Osbourne's music was intended to produce acts of suicide, either imminent or remote. 97 Here, Hell on
Earth was attempting to raise awareness for a person's right to die;
therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find the band's conduct
98
was directed at any person in particular.
Second, Hell on Earth's actions are unlikely to be considered
fighting words, as they did not result in immediate physical retaliation. 99 The fighting words doctrine has been applied very strictly
and is only applicable if the audience is likely to immediately seek
retribution. 10 0 In Osbourne, the court held that Osbourne's song
"Suicide Solution" did not constitute fighting words, explaining
92. For a discussion on the categories of unprotected speech, see supra notes
46-58 and accompanying text.
93. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1135, 1136 (2003) (noting unprotected speech outside scope of First
Amendment).
94. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (holding speech
protected by First Amendment even if it advocates illegal activity, as long as it remains abstract advocacy and does not incite imminent violence); see also Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (holding threats that imply action at uncertain and future remote times are not true threats and are therefore protected
under First Amendment).
95. SeeWaller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 n.2 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (alleging lyrics "[glet the gun and try it ... Shoot, shoot, shoot" fell outside First
Amendment protection as incitement to lawless action).
96. See id. at 1148-50 (arguing subliminal messages in music incited suicide).
97. See id. at 1151 (holding defendants' music was not directed toward any
particular person or group of persons, and there was no evidence that defendants'
music was intended to produce acts of suicide, or likely to cause imminent acts of
suicide) (emphasis in original).
98. See id. (noting abstract presentation of moral propriety or even moral necessity of suicide is distinct from indicating to people that they should commit
suicide and encouraging them to take such action).
99. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding "Fuck the Draft"
jacket did not constitute fighting words, as message was not directed to any particular person).
100. One scholar has theorized that the fighting words doctrine has lost its
vitality, noting that over fifty years have passed since the Chaplinsky decision, and
the Supreme Court has yet to affirm another conviction for use of fighting words.
See Thomas A. Schweitzer, Hate Speech on Campus and the First Amendment: Can They
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that the lyrics only discussed suicide in a philosophical sense. 10 1
Similarly, the actions of Hell on Earth were not likely to result in
retaliation, as the audience would likely perceive the suicide conduct as a message in support of euthanasia, not as a personal
threat.102

Third, the Hell on Earth concert involved no obscenity because there was nothing sexual about the suicide.1 0 3 Finally, the
10 4 Therespeech involved neither defamation nor false advertising.
fore, because the actions do not fall into one of the unprotected
categories of speech, Hell on Earth's conduct must be considered
either pure action or actions containing an expressive
105
component.
To escape application of the First Amendment completely, the
St. Petersburg City Council would have to argue that the actions of
Hell on Earth were merely conduct, containing no expressive component.10 6 It would be necessary for the government to divorce the
conduct from the message conveyed in order to render it outside
the purview of the First Amendment. 10 7 This result is unlikely, however, as Hell on Earth made palpable their views in support of assisted suicide. 10 8 If, however, a court determines that the suicide
conduct constitutes expressive conduct, it may be entitled to First
Amendment protection. 10 9
be Reconciled?, 27 CONN. L. REv. 493, 500 n.25 (1995) (noting restrictions on fighting words doctrine).
101. See Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. at 1151 (holding song advocated suicide in
philosophical sense as potential option in certain circumstances).
102. See Band Promotes, supra note 5 (noting Hell on Earth promoted concert
to support euthanasia).
103. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding obscenity outside
First Amendment protection).
104. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 340 (1995) (explaining fraud, libel, and false advertising involve interests sufficient to overcome
constitutional protection).
105. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (noting First
Amendment protects symbolic or expressive conduct as well as actual speech).
106. See id. (noting that not all conduct labeled "speech" is within purview of
First Amendment).
107. See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 319, 325 (1994) ("If one engages in conduct without any intent to communicate, or if nobody would understand one's action as communicating anything,
there is nothing for the First Amendment to protect.").
108. See Fight Concert, supra note 1 (noting concert is intended as statement in
support of euthanasia).
109. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 107, at 323-24 (recognizing conduct containing sufficient communicative element properly regarded as speech within
meaning of First Amendment).
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Hell on Earth's Suicide Concert as Expressive Conduct

To determine if conduct is expressive and afforded First
Amendment protection, there must be intent to convey a particular
message, and the likelihood must be great that the message would
1'
be understood by those who viewed it.11 ° In Cohen v. California,"
1
the Supreme Court explained the concept of expressive conduct. 12
Defendant Cohen was convicted of breaching the peace when he
walked through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket with the
words "Fuck the Draft.""13 The Court overturned the defendant's
conviction, holding that the state may not make a simple public
display of an expletive a criminal offense.1 1 4 The Court reasoned
that such a message was within the protection of the First Amendment because it was "expressive conduct," or conduct conveying a
115
particular viewpoint.
Here, the presentation of a terminally-ill patient committing
suicide onstage is also expressive conduct. 116 It almost certainly
conveys a particular message regarding euthanasia, and it is likely
that the audience will understand it as such, particularly if the event
is preceded by an explanation or announcement.1 7 Therefore, the
conduct of Hell on Earth is sufficiently expressive in nature so as to
fall within the purview of the First Amendment. 1 8
Because the conduct falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, it is next necessary to determine whether the St. Petersburg
City Council was engaging in a content-neutral, conduct-based, or
110. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (noting conduct is sufficiently expressive if message is particular and likely to be understood by audience);
see also Cole & Eskridge, supra note 107, at 325 ("[T]he threshold inquiry in any
expressive conduct case is whether the plaintiff's conduct was intended to communicate a message, or whether it would be understood by others as
communicative.").
111. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
112. See id. at 18 (noting state lacked power to punish Cohen for underlying
content of message).
113. See id. at 16 (noting defendant convicted because statute prohibited
breach of peace through offensive conduct).
114. See id. at 18 (holding defendant's conduct constitutionally protected unless there was showing of intent to incite disobedience or disruption of draft).
115. See id. at 21 (noting unwilling viewers can avert their eyes).
116. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (recognizing expressive conduct does not actually have to involve spoken word).
117. The band's website explained their right-to-die platform and any fan
would likely understand that the onstage suicide was in support of euthanasia. See
Hell Website, supra note 6 ("I am a strong supporter of physician-assisted suicide.").
118. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (recognizing conduct, if
sufficiently intertwined with communicative elements, is protected by First
Amendment).
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viewpoint-based regulation when it passed the emergency ordi19 Here,
nance, in order to assess the level of scrutiny required.
Hell on Earth would argue that the government restricted its
speech purely because of the message conveyed, and therefore, the
120 The
regulation is an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction.
would argue that this is a permissigovernment, on the other hand,
121
regulation.
conduct-based
ble
Hell on Earth's Suicide Concert Under Strict Scrutiny
Content-based restrictions are generally prohibited, except in
the area of obscenity. 122 The suicide concert does not qualify as
obscenity, and the government is therefore unable to restrict
123 As stated
speech simply because they wish to protect the public.
in R.A. V, however, content-based regulations can be constitutional,
124 Under this standard,
so long as they satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
a law will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling
government interest.' 2 5 The band here would argue that this is an
unconstitutional content-based restriction because it is impairing
126
the expressive character of the concert and the suicide conduct.
C.

119. See e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) (discussing levels of scrutiny).
120. Laws aimed at the communicative impact of speech are considered to be
content-based. See David, supra note 63, at 214 (noting when expression is restricted because of communicative impact of message, state is impermissibly focusing on content of message).
121. This case is unlikely to be considered a content-neutral "time, place, and
manner" regulation because these regulations include situations where the government most likely is regulating conduct and not speech, and any subsequent effect
on speech is incidental. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (noting typical time, place, and manner regulations are generally zoning ordinances, with no relationship to type of speech involved).
122. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (noting Supreme
Court had always assumed that obscenity was unprotected under First
Amendment).
123. See Adam M. Kanzer, Misfit Power, The First Amendment and the Public Forum: Is There Room in America for the Grateful Dead?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
521, 560 (1992) (noting thin line between permissible content-neutral regulations
of secondary effects and impermissible content-based regulations).
124. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (stating that content-based statutes require application of strict scrutiny). The Supreme Court uses
the strict scrutiny standard when a suspect classification or fundamental right is
involved. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting suspect classifications include race and national origin); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (noting fundamental rights include marriage and abortion).
125. See IA.V, 505 U.S. at 395 (noting application of strict scrutiny test to
facially content-based statutes).
126. See e.g., Alameda, 535 U.S. at 434 (noting content-based regulations subject to strict scrutiny). The Court in Alameda concluded that if a regulation was
content based, it would be considered presumptively invalid. Id.
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The St. Petersburg City Council, on the other hand, would argue
that even if they are infringing on the band's free speech, they have
done so for a compelling interest and in the least restrictive manner
possible.

1 27

Under a strict scrutiny analysis, it is questionable whether the
city council permissibly restricted the actions of Hell on Earth. 128
Saving the life of a terminally-ill patient is likely a compelling governmental interest. 29 If, however, the city council prohibited the
speech so as to prevent potential copycat suicides, a court may not
find the interest compelling. 3 0o Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has
held that it is unlawful to ban speech simply because it is effective.131 In American Bookseller's Association v. Hudnut,132 Judge Easterbook argued that even if pornography as expression caused rape,
it was unlawful to prohibit that speech because it may persuade people to commit violent sexual crimes. 133 In addition, the pornography was not advocating rape or violent crimes; the rape was a
secondary effect, which is generally a permissible arena for government regulation. 3 4 Similarly, Hell on Earth is not advocating suicide, but only presenting the suicide conduct to raise awareness for
right-to-die issues. 135 Any copycat suicide would require mental in-

termediation, and suppression of speech for this reason is
36

impermissible. 1

127. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395 (recognizing that ordinance could survive attack if necessary to achieve compelling state interest).
128. In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the governmental interest must be compelling with means narrowly tailored to achieve that end. See id. at 395 (describing
strict scrutiny analysis).
129. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (indicating prevention of
crime renders regulation content-neutral).
130. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding any adverse effects of pornography as speech require mental intermediation and are within First Amendment protection).
131. See id. ("[T]his simply demonstrates the power of pornography as
speech.").
132. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).

133. See id. (noting it is unlawful to ban speech simply because it is effective).
134. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (approving zoning ordinance that singles out theaters showing sexually explicit movies based on concern for secondary effects). While regulations based on a concern
of secondary effects are permissible, the government may not pass regulations that
have the effect of restricting speech if the rationale of that regulation is to suppress
that particular speech. See Shiffrin, supra note 93, at 1135 (discussing tension between Court's approach to incendiary speech and its approach to regulation of
secondary effects).
135. See New Law, supra note 4 (describing intent to raise awareness for
euthanasia).
136. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (noting requirement of mental intermediation brings speech within domain of First Amendment).
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If the government satisfies the compelling state interest standard, the means employed must also be narrowly tailored to
achieve that end. 137 The St. Petersburg City Council passed the
138 In doing
emergency ordinance to prevent the onstage suicide.
so, they did prevent that suicide at that particular venue, but they
13 9 The regulation
also may have prevented other protected speech.
makes it a crime to "conduct a suicide for commercial or entertainment purposes and to host, promote and sell tickets for such an
event." 140 This city council ordinance is not narrowly tailored, because as written, a variety of conduct could potentially be made
criminal. 41 For example, the ordinance encompasses all suicides
for commercial or entertainment purposes, including those that
are staged or portrayed in movies. 142 Therefore, under a strict scru14 3 If a court detertiny analysis, Hell on Earth would likely succeed.
mines that the city ordinance is not a regulation of content, but
the court would have to
rather a regulation of expressive conduct,
144
scrutiny.
apply the test of intermediate

137. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728 (2000) (explaining statute is narrowly tailored if it does not burden more speech than necessary).
138. See New Law, supra note 4 (reporting city council wanted to prevent
suicide).
139. See id. (discussing ordinance). The ordinance makes it illegal to conduct
a suicide for entertainment or commercial purposes, and to host, promote, or sell
tickets for that event. See id. While this prevents the suicide at the Hell on Earth
concert, it also prohibits simulated suicide, such as in movies, which is protected
under the First Amendment. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 65 (1981) (noting motion picture entertainment is protected by First
Amendment).
140. New Law, supra note 4 (describing purpose of ordinance).
141. See id. (noting city ordinance makes it illegal to conduct suicide for commercial or entertainment purposes, and to host, promote and sell tickets for such
an event).
142. See id. (discussing ordinance).
143. The narrowly tailored component may also implicate the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)
(elucidating overbreadth doctrine as regulation that punishes substantial amount
of protected free speech judged in relation to statute's plainly legitimate sweep).
Such a regulation is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. See id. at 615;
see also Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577
(1987) (holding airport authority rule that bans "all First Amendment activities"
within "central terminal area" is invalid as being substantially overbroad).
144. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002)
(explaining content-neutral ordinances receive intermediate scrutiny).
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Hell on Earth's Suicide Concert Under Intermediate Scrutiny

Most likely, the actions of the St. Petersburg City Council will
be analyzed under an intermediate standard. 1 45 The city council
would argue that their regulation is content-neutral, as it is not
aimed at the particular idea of euthanasia, but instead seeks to prevent a public suicide. 146 For a law to be treated as content-neutral,
the governmental interest behind the law must be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. 147 The test that has been developed
for intermediate scrutiny analysis is the O'Brien test. 148
Under O'Brien, a court will uphold a conduct regulation if. (1)
the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to suppression of
speech; and (4) the incidental burden on speech is no greater than
145. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 313 (2000) (noting intermediate scrutiny requires regulating government to make some demonstration of evidentiary basis for harm it claims to flow from expressive activity and for alleviation
expected from restriction imposed).
146. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(holding zoning ordinance designed to combat undesirable secondary effects of
adult-entertainment establishments is content-neutral regulation).
147. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (noting
content-neutral regulation will be sustained under First Amendment if it advances
important governmental interests unrelated to suppression of free speech and
does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests).
148. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (describing elements that justify government regulation). O'Brien was convicted when he
burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse in the presence
of a sizable crowd. See id. at 369. He claimed that his conviction was contrary to
the First Amendment because his act was "symbolic speech," or expressive conduct. See id. at 376. The Supreme Court rejected his contention that symbolic
speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection, saying:
[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in
O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it
does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms .... [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is suffi-

cientlyjustified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
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necessary. 149 If, however, the regulation seeks only to prohibit the
communicative impact of the conduct and has no regulatory interest, the O'Brien test will not be satisfied. 1 50 If the governmental interest is related to the suppression of free expression, strict scrutiny
51
is required unless the speech is in an unprotected category.'
There is no question that the first prong is satisfied because the
ordinance was enacted by the city council, and it is within their
power to enact ordinances that protect the tranquility of the community.1 52 Under the second prong, the city council need only
demonstrate an "important" governmental interest; this is a lower
threshold than "compelling" as was applied in the strict scrutiny
analysis. 15 3 Because preventing the death of an individual is a compelling government interest, it follows that it is also an important
governmental interest. 5 4 The third prong requires that the gov1 55
ernmental interest be unrelated to the suppression of speech.
Here, the ordinance does not mention any message that might accompany the suicide; rather it prohibits the act of suicide, regardless of the reason.156 Therefore, the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of speech because the ordinance is
157 Finally, the
attempting to prevent deaths through suicide.
O'Brien test requires that the burden on speech be no greater than
149. See id. at 377 (describing prongs); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (using O'Brien test to hold Indiana's public indecency
statute constitutional).
150. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1969) (striking prohibition against students wearing armbands to protest Vietnam
War).
151. For a discussion on unprotected speech, see supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
152. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (noting it is within
police power of state to protect health, safety, welfare, and morals of community).
153. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455-56
(2002) (noting strict scrutiny requires "compelling" government interest and intermediate scrutiny requires "important" government interest).
154. The Supreme Court has found several interests to be "important" within
the meaning of the O'Brien test. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,
369 (2002) (holding preservation of FDA's drug approval process is important governmental interest); see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000)
(holding ordinance furthered important government interests of regulating conduct through public nudity ban and combating harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing).
155. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (discussing "less stringent" O'Brien standard of intermediate scrutiny).
156. See New Law, supra note 4 (recognizing council wanted to prevent suicide
at concert).
157. See id. (quoting council member who wanted to exercise caution and
prevent suicide).
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necessary to achieve the end. 58 This prong encompasses a balancing test, whereby the government's interests and the individual's
freedom of expression are weighed.15 9
In order for the government to satisfy the fourth prong of
O'Brien, it must demonstrate that the harm is real, not just speculative, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate the harm in a direct and material way. 160 Here, the city council proceeded after
hearing that a suicide would take place at the Hell on Earth concert.1 6 ' Knowing that Hell on Earth was famous for its wild concert
stunts, the city council could reasonably have believed the suicide
would actually take place. 162 The emergency ordinance would alleviate the potential suicide directly, by making it unlawful to present
a suicide. 1 63 Under the fourth prong, the government must still
demonstrate that the remedy adopted does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary. 164 While there may be some
burden on constitutionally protected speech, the regulation must
still be upheld if the burden is only incidental. 165 The city council
could demonstrate that they did what they needed to do in order to
158. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 301 (requiring restriction be no greater than
necessary to further city's interest).
159. See David, supra note 63, at 228 (stating balance includes extent to which
communicative activity is inhibited and values, interests, or rights served by enforcing inhibition).
160. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (quoting
Quincy Cable T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (emphasizing when government regulates speech to redress past harms or prevent future
harms, it must do more than "posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured").
161. The city council acted after hearing about the concert, but before the
suicide actually took place. See New Law, supra note 4 (discussing emergency ordinance). Occasionally, courts may classify such actions as an unlawful prior restraint. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))
("[A]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."). Despite the unpopularity
of prior restraints, they will be upheld if some special harm would otherwise result.
See id. at 430-31. Here, the death of an individual would be considered a "special
harm" and this prior restraint is unlikely to run afoul of the First Amendment. See
id. (recognizing that lighting fire near ammunition dump is sufficiently special to
justify restriction).
162. See New Law, supra note 4 (noting concern for potential adverse
consequences).
163. See id. (noting city ordinance made it unlawful to conduct suicide for
commercial or entertainment purposes).
164. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (discussing prongs
of intermediate scrutiny analysis).
165. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (holding Indiana's public indecency statute justified despite incidental limitations on some expressive activity).
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prevent a public suicide, and any proscription on constitutionally
of inprotected speech is minimal. 166 Under the O'Brien standard
167
prevail.
likely
would
government
the
termediate scrutiny,
IV.

CONCLUSION

The suicide conduct of Hell on Earth was sufficiently mixed
with communicative elements so as to come within the purview of
the First Amendment. 168 The action of presenting a suicide was
intertwined with the band's viewpoint on euthanasia and the rightto-die with dignity. 169 As such, the band's conduct constituted 17ex0
pressive conduct within the meaning of the First Amendment.
Following First Amendment analysis, the city council must then
demonstrate that its actions were not based on suppressing the particular viewpoint of the band.1 71 If, however, the actions of the St.
Petersburg City Council were undertaken to prevent the promulgation of Hell on Earth's support of euthanasia, the city council
72 Under
would have to satisfy the stringent strict scrutiny analysis.'
this analysis, the government is unlikely to succeed; even though
preventing deaths may be a compelling government173interest, the
means are not narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
The more appropriate standard of review, however, is intermediate scrutiny.17 4 Although the communication of right-to-die issues is within the protection of the First Amendment, the
government has a substantial interest in preventing public suicide
166. See New Law, supra note 4 (reporting city council's belief that ordinance
would prevent suicide).
167. For a discussion on intermediate scrutiny, see supra notes 145-66 and
accompanying text.
168. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (noting conduct containing
communicative elements may constitute expressive conduct within meaning of
First Amendment).
169. See New Law, supra note 4 ("This is about standing up for what you believe in, and I am a strong supporter of physician-assisted suicide.").
170. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding expressive conduct protected by First Amendment).
171. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985) (noting government is prohibited from regulating based on viewpoint).
172. For a discussion on strict scrutiny, see supra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
173. See New Law, supra note 4 (describing ordinance). The ordinance impermissibly encompasses protected conduct, such as simulated suicide. See Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (noting motion picture entertainment, radio and television programs, and live entertainment protected by
First Amendment).
174. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (noting regulation
unrelated to expression calls for intermediate standard of review for noncommunicative conduct).
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and combating any secondary effects.1 75 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that a content-based ordinance may be converted
into a content-neutral regulation provided that the ordinance isjustifled by a desire to eliminate a "secondary harm."'1 76 Certainly,
combating public suicide and the resulting effects is a harm unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 177 Further, the city
council banned all suicide for public or entertainment purposes,
regardless of the reason involved. 178 This indicates that the city
council was motivated by a desire to save the life of the individual
and combat adverse secondary effects, rather than suppressing Hell
on Earth's views regarding euthanasia. 179
Following the enactment of the city ordinance, Pinellas
County, Florida, approved a similar ordinance.18 0 The county's ordinance is less problematic than that enacted by the St. Petersburg
City Council.' 8 ' This regulation is drawn more narrowly, as it prohibits only public suicides, rather than suicides for any entertainment purpose. 182 In addition, a bill has been introduced by Florida
State Senator Les Miller that would make it illegal to advertise, perform, or sell tickets to a show featuring "self-murder."'1 3 This statute is also narrowly tailored, as it makes an exception for acts of
"simulated self-murder" such as in plays or movies, as long
as the
audience is informed that no actual suicide is planned. 8 4
To combat any potential problems, the St. Petersburg City
Council should amend the ordinance to reflect the ordinance writ175. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986)
(discussing secondary effects doctrine). In Playtime Theatres, the Supreme Court

noted that the ordinance at issue did not fit neatly into a "content-based" or "con-

tent-neutral" category. See id. at 47. Instead, the Court noted that while the ordinance on its face appeared to regulate the content of the speech, it was

nevertheless more similar to a content-neutral regulation because the
predominate concern was to deal with the secondary effects of the speech at issue.

See id. at 47-48.
176. Kanzer, supra note 123, at 538-39 (describing Court's approach to secondary effects doctrine).
177. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 302 (2000) (holding expressive conduct of nude dancing outside protection of First Amendment).
178. See New Law, supra note 4 (recognizing council wanted to prevent suicide
at concert).
179. See id. (reporting impetus behind ordinance was to save life).
180. See Ban Suicides, supra note 16 (noting county enacted ordinance over

concern for secondary effects).

181. See id. (noting ordinance banned all public suicide, as well as promotion
of public suicide).
182. See id. (describing county ordinance).
183. Bill Targets Suicide for Show, supra note 3 (describing proposed bill).
184. See id. (noting informed consent would only be required if it was small
forum and ambiguity existed as to authenticity of suicide).
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ten by the county because the county ordinance is sufficiently tai18 5
lored so as to not burden speech any more than necessary.
Nevertheless, as written, the city ordinance could likely survive a
constitutional challenge under the O'Brien standard of intermediate
scrutiny, particularly on the basis that it was combating adverse sec186
ondary effects.
In the end, the St. Petersburg City Council was justified in its
actions because it could reasonably believe that a suicide would
have taken place at the Hell on Earth concert. 187 More importantly, Hell on Earth was still able to communicate its views on eu18 8
thanasia through their website, and a human life was spared.
Elizabeth Cameron
185. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (discussing intermediate scrutiny).
186. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (approving secondary effects doctrine).
187. See New Law, supra note 4 (describing past concert stunts).
188. See Hell Website, supra note 6 (continuing to advocate physician assisted
suicide through postings on website).
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